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The Leaning Tower: Do the Proposed Amendments
to SEC Rule 15c2-12 Violate the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975?*
I. INTRODUcTION
The aggregate size of the municipal debt market approaches
the size of the corporate debt market. Investors held a total of
$1038.2 billion in state and local obligations at the end of the
third quarter of 1993, compared to $1203.0 billion in corporate
obligations.' Despite this similarity in size, the disclosure
protections municipal investors receive are significantly less defined
than those in corporate finance.2 The historical market perception
that municipal securities are second only to federal government
securities in terms of safety explains, in part, this disparity.'
Despite the perception of safety, the municipal market has,
from time to time, embroiled itself in scandals resulting in con-
gressional investigations and increased regulatory attention.4
Events in the late 1960s and early 1970s, including the scandals
* The author wishes to express his gratitude to Robert and Yukari Vincent of Cali-
fornia Municipal Statistics, Inc., San Francisco, for their training and guidance in the
field of public finance. The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1 Summay of Credit Market Debt Outstanding, 80 FED. RES. BULL A43 (Mar. 1994).
2 See ROBERT LAMB & STEPHEN P. RAPPAPORT, MUNIcIPAL BONDS 225-26 (2d ed.
1987).
3 See id, Section 3(a)(29) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines "municipal
securities" as:
[S]ecurities which are direct obligations of, or obligations guaranteed as to prin-
cipal or interest by, a State or any political subdivision thereof, or any agency or
instrumentality of a State or any political subdivision thereof, or any municipal
corporate instrumentality of one or more States, or any security which is an
industrial development bond (as defined in section 103(c)(2) of title 26) the
interest on which is excludable from gross income under section 103(a)(1) of
title 26 if, by reason of the application of paragraph (4) or (6) of section
103(c) of title 26 (determined as if paragraphs (4)(A), (5), and (7) were not in-
cluded in such section 103(c)), paragraph (1) of such section 103(c) does not
apply to such security.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(29) (1988) (footnotes omitted).
4 See LAMB & RAPPAPORT, supra note 2, at 227, 229, 253-55; Robert A. Fippinger &
Edward L. Pittman, Disclosure Obligations of Underwriters of Municipal Securities, 47 BUS. LAW.
127, 127-29 (1991); Joel Seligman, The Municipal Disclosure Debate 9 DEL J. CORP. L. 647,
651-54 (1984).
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involving so-called "boiler room" operations and the 1974-75 New
York City fiscal crisis, gave rise to increased regulatory scrutiny,
and ultimately, legislative action.5 In the mid to late 1980s, the
default of the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS)
brought increased scrutiny of the municipal bond market.6 More
recently, in late April 1993, the municipal market was shaken by
the announcement. that Merrill Lynch and New York City Comp-
troller Elizabeth Holtzman were under ,investigation by various
federal and local authorities for alleged abuses involving cam-
paign contribution practices.' This latest scandal has served as a
backdrop for renewed inquiry into the ongoing problem of inade-
quate secondary market disclosure, and regulatory attention is
once again centered on the municipal marketplace.8
Many of the current investigations into disclosure practices
focus on who controls the process of selling municipal bonds.
Control over this process comes from various sectors. Conflicts
typically arise not only with regard to federal and state powers but
also among those who participate in the industry.9 The type of
obligation sold is often determinative. Currently, disclosure ques-
tions are often resolved by the interplay between market partici-
pants and not as a direct result of federal or state disclosure obli-
gations." The way in which a deal is sold also determines disclo-
sure obligations. Foi example, in a competitive transaction, the
financial advisor to the issuer is primarily responsible for adequate
primary market disclosure." In negotiated transactions, however,
this responsibility typically shifts to the lead or managing under-
writer.
I2
To alleviate market uncertainty over disclosure obligations, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a statement
("Statement") on March 9, 1994 to provide guidance to market
participants on the application of the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws to transactions in municipal securities."
5 See ROBERT A. FIPPINGER, THE SECURITIES LAW OF PUBLIC FINANCE 490 (2d ed.
1993); see also LAMB & RAPPAPORT, supra note 2, at 227, 229-30, 253-55; Seligman, supra
note 4, at 661-70.
6 See Fippinger & Pittman, supra note 4, at 130-31.
7 See infra note 104.
8 See infra Part III.B.
9 See LAMB & RAPPAPORT, supra note 2, at 230-32.
10 See id. at 237-39.
11 See id. at 238.
12 See id.
13 Statement Regarding Disclosure Obligations of Municipal Securities Issuers and
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The Statement advises issuers and underwriters of ways to mini-
mize potential exposure to antifraud liability through disclosure in
both the primary and secondary municipal securities markets. 4 In
addition, the SEC, in a separate release,'5 proposed rule amend-
ments ("Proposed Amendments") which, if adopted, would make it
unlawful for any broker-dealer to underwrite new municipal issues
when the issuer does not commit to provide ongoing disclosure to
the market by depositing information in a repository. 6 The
Proposed Amendments would also require broker-dealers to review
ongoing disclosure prior to recommending secondary market
transactions in municipal securities.' Finally, the SEC proposed a
new rule and rule changes regarding confirmations of transactions
in municipal bonds."
This Note examines the federal regulation of municipal secu-
rities in light of the current regulatory activity in the market. Part
II provides an overview of the current state of federal regulation
of municipal bonds. 9 Part III discusses the ongoing problem of
inadequate secondary market disclosure," and summarizes the
SEC's Statement and Proposed Amendments." Part IV examines
the legislative history behind the creation of the Municipal Secu-
rities Rulemaking Board22 (MSRB) and the adoption of the Tow-
er Amendment to the Securities Acts Amendments of 197523
("1975 Amendments"). Part V argues that the SEC must acknowl-
edge the congressional intent behind the creation of the MSRB
and the adoption of the Tower Amendment. 4 While it may be
Others, Securities Act Release No. 7049, Exchange Act Release No. 33,741, 59 Fed. Reg.
12,748 (Mar. 9, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 Statement].
14 Id.
15 Exchange Act Release No. 33,742, 59 Fed. Reg. 12,759 (Mar. 9, 1994) [hereinafter
1994 Release].
16 Id. at 12,760. This Note will use "broker-dealer" to refer to any broker, dealer or
municipal securities dealer.
17 Id at 12,762.
18 Exchange Act Release No. 33,743, 59 Fed: Reg. 12,767 (Mar. 9, 1994). The SEC
proposes to amend Rule lOb-10 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to clarify the
operation of the Rule. Id In addition, the SEC is proposing a new rule, Rule 15c2-13, to
require broker-dealer disclosure of certain pricing and rating information. Id. This Note
ill limit its discussion to the Statement and the Proposed Amendments.
19 See infra Part II.
20 See infra Part III.A.
21 See infra Part III.B.
22 See infra Part IV.A.1.
23 Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see infra Part IV.A.2.
24 See infra Part IV.B.
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entirely appropriate for the SEC to provide guidance to market
participants on the application of the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws, the Proposed Amendments violate the spirit
of the Tower Amendment and the congressional intent behind the
creation of the MSRB. This Note argues that any decision regard-
ing the regulation of issuers, either directly or indirectly, must be
made by Congress.2 5
II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF MUNICIPAL BONDS
A. In General
Historically, federal involvement in the municipal securities
market has been minimal. The Securities Act of 193326 ("1933
Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 193427 ("1934 Act")
generally exempt municipal issuers from the registration and reg-
ulatory requirements imposed upon private corporate issuers.
While municipal securities are categorized as "securities" under the
1933 Act,2" they are exempt pursuant to section 3(a)(2).Y This
exemption excludes issuers of municipal securities from registering
prospectuses and certain disclosures."0 The section 3(a)(2) ex-
emption also includes those sections of the 1933 Act which relate
to the sales of securities made prior to the registration of offering
memorandum." Section 17,2 the general antifraud provision, is
the only restraint on municipal bonds contained in the 1933 Act.
It deals with the omission or material misstatement of facts in an
official document given to a potential investor.3
The 1934 Act does not contain a broad exemption for munic-
ipal securities similar to section 3(a) (2) of the 1933 Act, and each
section of the 1934 Act must be reviewed to determine if munici-
pal securities are exempt from coverage. Section 10 of the 1934
Act prohibits the use, by any person, of any deceptive device in
connection with the purchase and sale of any security. Rule 10b-
5,35 promulgated under section 10(b)" and adopted in 1942,
25 See id.
26 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77m (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
27 Id. §§ 78a-78jj.
28 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988).
29 Id. § 77c(a)(2).
30 Id.
31 M
32 Id. § 7 7q.
33 Id
34 Id. § 78j.
35 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
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generally prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security,37 but does not specifically state that municipal
securities are contained within its provisions.
Events in the late 1960s and early 1970s, including the numer-
ous incidences of fraudulent practices exposed by the SEC,"8 gave
rise to increased congressional scrutiny of the municipal market-
place. And federal action was not limited to Congress. The SEC
investigated the events leading up to the 1974-75 fiscal crisis in
New York City and took a strong stand against the participants
and practices within the municipal securities industry. 9 As a re-
sult of the near-bankruptcy of New York City, questions of ade-
quate disclosure and what constitutes reasonable care in investi-
gating and presenting the nature of an issuer were argued at
length for the first time.4"
Prior to 1975, section 17 of the 1933 Act4e ' and section 10 of
the' 1934 Act42 were the only federal limitations relating to the
issuance of municipal securities. While the original version of
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act did not apply to municipal issu-
ers,43 the 1975 Amendments" added "governmnt, or political
subdivision, agency or instrumentality of a government" to the
definition of "person" in section 3(a)(9).4" The 1975 Amend-
ments also removed the exemption from SEC registration for
broker-dealers who trade municipal securities. Applications to
trade municipal securities must now be filed with the SEC,46 and
the SEC may deny an applicant according to its guidelines.
Perhaps most significantly, the 1975 Amendments created the
MSRB.48 Pursuant to section 15B(c)(1) of the 1934 Act,49 every
36 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
37 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (1993).
38 See FIPPINGER, supra note 5, at 490.
39 See LAMB & RAPPAPORT, supra note 2, at 208, 214.
40 See FIPPINGER. supra note 5. at 490-91; Seligman, supra note 4, at 661-68.
41 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1988).
42 Id. § 78j.
43 See In re New York City Mun. Sec. Litig., 507 F. Supp. 169, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Woods v. Homes & Structures of Pittsburg, Kansas, 489 F. Supp. 1270, 1280-81 (D. Kan.
1980).
44 Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
45 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1988).
46 Id. § 78o-4(a)(1).
47 Id. § 78o-4(a) (2).
48 Id. § 78o-4(b)(1). See generally Roswell C. Dikeman, Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board: A New Concept of Self-Regulation, 29 VAND. L. REv. 903 (1976); Thomas P. Peacock,
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underwriter or broker-dealer of municipal securities must comply
with rules promulgated by the MSRB.5 The purpose of the
MSRB is to oversee practices within the municipal securities in-
dustry.-" Congress established the MSRB as an independent, self-
regulatory organization that would be the primary rulemaking
authority for the municipal marketplace. 2 Pursuant to section
15B(d) (1), the MSRB is composed of members who serve two-year
terms: (a) five public representatives not associated with any bro-
ker-dealer, at least one of whom shall be an issuer representative;
(b) five nonbank representatives who are associated with municipal
securities broker-dealers; and (c) five dealer bank representa-
tives." The composition of the MSRB is heavily weighted towards
the broker-dealer community due to the Board's primary function
of formulating rules which exclusively govern the conduct of mu-
nicipal securities broker-dealers."
A key provision of the 1975 Amendments which restricts the
regulatory efforts of both the SEC and the MSRB is the Tower
Amendment, codified at section 15B(d) of the 1934 Act.5 Section
15B(d) (1) of the Amendment provides that no issuer of a munici-
pal security shall be required to file with the SEC or the MSRB
prior to the sale of securities any document or information in
connection with such sale.5" In addition, pursuant to section
15B(d)(2), the MSRB is not permitted to require any issuer to
furnish to the MSRB or any purchaser "any application, report,
document, or information with respect to such issuer."57 The
MSRB may, however, require municipal securities broker-dealers to
provide any such disclosure information to the MSRB or purchas-
ers or prospective purchasers of municipal securities." The con-
gressional intent in adopting the Tower Amendment, as this Note
argues, was to eliminate issuer responsibility for disclosure obliga-
A Review of Municipal Securities and Their Status Under the Federal Securities Laws as Amended
by the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, 31 BuS. LAW. 2037 (1976).
49 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c)(1) (1988).
50 Id
51 Id § 78o-4(b)(2).
52 See FIPPINGER, supra note 5, at 502; see also infra Part ]V.A.1.
53 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(1) (1988).
54 See id. § 78o-4(b)(2).
55 See id. § 78o-4(d). For a discussion of the legislative history of the Tower Amend-
ment, see Peacock, supra note 48, at 2051-53; infra Part IV.B.2.
56 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d)(1) (1988).
57 Id. § 78o-4(d)(2).
58 Id.
[Vol. 69:5
NOTE-PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULE 15c2-12
tions, shifting the disclosure and regulatory burden in almost all
circumstances to municipal securities broker-dealers. 9
The municipal securities industry reacted to the increase in
federal oversight and potential liability by increasing disclosure.'
Underwriters and financial consultants had customarily prepared
"offering circulars" for new municipal issues." Throughout the
1970s these circulars began to contain more detail and form.62 By
the late 1980s, the official statement had become the standard dis-
closure document for municipal securities issues.63 These booklet
form documents are typically consistent in the information they
provide and are patterned after the section 10 prospectus required
for corporate securities registration under the 1933 Act.' This
consistency results in part from the publication of the Guidelines
for Offerings of Securities by State and Local Governments by the Gov-
ernment Finance Officers Association.' These Guidelines, pub-
lished in final form in 1976 and updated periodically, are heavily
promoted and continue to play an important role in institutional-
izing and improving the content and consistency of offering docu-
mentation. 66
B. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 26,100 and Rule 15c2-12
On September 22, 1988, the SEC made its report to Congress
on its investigation into the WPPSS bond default,6' the largest de-
fault by any municipal issuer in United States history. With its
report, the SEC, in 1934 Act Release No. 26,1001 ("Release"),
published its interpretation69 ("Interpretation") of the legal re-
sponsibilities imposed by the general antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws on underwriters participating in municipal
59 See infra Part IVA2.
60 See LAMB & RAPPAPORT, supra note 2, at 229-32.
61 See itd; Peacock, supra note 48, at 2040.
62 See LAMB & RAPPAPORT, supra note 2, at 230-31; Peacock, supra note 48, at 2040.
63 See LAMB & RAPPAPORT, supra note 2, at 232-33.
64 See id. Section 10 of the 1933 Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1988).
65 GOVERNMENT FINANCE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES FOR STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1991).
66 See FIPPINGER, supra note 5, at 31-32; LAMB & RAPPAPORT, supra note 2, at 230-32;
Peacock, supra note 48, at 2040.
67 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STAFF REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION IN
THE MATrER OF TRANSACTIONS IN WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SECURITIES (Sept.
1988).
68 53 Fed. Reg. 37,778 (Sept. 26, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 Release].
69 Id. at 37,787-91.
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offerings. The Interpretation is the SEC's clearest statement of the
standards applicable to underwriters of municipal securities and
effectively mandates the use of an official statement in municipal
offerings. 0
1. The Interpretation
Section III of the Release sets forth the SEC's Interpretation
of the general standard applicable to municipal underwriters.71
The Interpretation "emphasize[s] the obligation of a municipal
underwriter to have a reasonable basis for recommending any
municipal securities and its responsibility, in fulfilling that obliga-
tion, to review in a professional manner the accuracy of the offer-
ing statements with which it is associated."72 The Interpretation
further explains that the standard of care required of an under-
writer depends upon the circumstances. 7 At a minimum, the SEC
expects "that [municipal] underwriters will review the issuer's
disclosure documents in a professional manner for possible inaccu-
racies and omissions."74 Beyond this "baseline" level of review, the
SEC states certain factors that it and courts might consider rel-
evant in determining whether the underwriter's investigation was
reasonable.75
. The Interpretation repeatedly asserts the SEC's position that a
broker-dealer engaged in underwriting municipal securities has a
heightened obligation to have a reasonable basis for recommend-
ing securities:
The underwriter stands between the issuer and the public pur-
chasers, assisting the issuer in pricing and, at times, in structur-
70 See id. The effective mandate arises as a result of the SEC's emphasis upon the
duty of an underwriter to review offering documentation prior to bidding on an issue.
See id. at 37,788-89; see also infra notes 72-75, 148-49 and accompanying text. For a de-
tailed discussion of the Interpretation, see Fippinger & Pittman, supra note 4, at 131-38.
71 See 1988 Release, supra note 68, at 37,787-88.
72 Id. at 37,787.
73 Id. at 37,789.
74 Id.
75 Id. These factors, as modified in part by 1934 Act Release No. 26,985, include:
(1) the extent to which the underwriter relied upon municipal officials, employees, ex-
perts, and other persons whose duties have given them knowledge of particular facts; (2)
the role of the underwriter (manager, syndicate member, or selected broker-dealer); (3)
the type of bonds being offered (general obligation, revenue, or private activity); (4) the
past familiarity of the underwriter with the issuer, (5) the length of time to maturity of
,the bonds; and (6) whether the bonds are competitively bid or distributed in a negotiat-
ed offering. Id.; Exchange Act Release No. 26,985, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,799, 28,812 (July 10,
1989) [hereinafter 1989 Release].
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ing the financing and preparing disclosure documents. Most
importantly, its role is to place the offered securities with pub-
lic investors. By participating in an offering, an underwriter
makes an implied recommendation about the securities. Be-
cause the underwriter holds itself out as a securities profession-
al, and especially in light of its position vis-a-vis the issuer, this
recommendation itself implies that the underwriter has a rea-
sonable basis for belief in the truthfulness and completeness of
the key representations made in any disclosure documents used
in the offerings."
This provision is underscored by the SEC's belief that investors in
the municipal marketplace tend to rely upon underwriters to per-
form the investigative function and will weigh the reputation of an
underwriter in determining whether to invest.7
The Interpretation clearly signals a more aggressive stance by
the SEC in dealing with perceived abuses in the municipal market-
place. The Interpretation was drafted in lieu of taking enforce-
ment action against the WPPSS underwriters to clarify what had
previously been a gray area.' The Interpretation states that:
It is incumbent on firms participating in an offering and on
dealers recommending municipal bonds to their customers as
"good municipal bonds" to make diligent inquiry, investigation
and disclosure as to material facts relating to the issuer of the
securities and bearing upon the ability of the issuer to service
such bonds."
Thus, the SEC has stressed the need for municipal underwriters to
conduct a reasonable inquiry in all circumstances before recom-
mending securities to their customers. 0
2. Rule 15c2-12
At the same time the SEC published the Interpretation, it
proposed," and in 1989 adopted, 2  Rule 15c2-12 3  ("Rule").
76 1988 Release, supra note 68, at 37,787.
77 Id. at 37,887-88.
78 See Fippinger & Pittman, supra note 4, at 130.
79 1988 Release, supra note 68, at 37,788 n.76 (quoting Walston & Co., Exchange
Act Release No. 8165, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,474
(Sept. 22, 1967)).
80 See id at 37,787.
81 Id. at 37,782-87.
82 1989 Release, supra note 75.
83 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12, (1993). For a detailed discussion of Rule 15c2-12, see
1994]
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The Release outlines that the Rule is consistent with the SEC's
implementation of a "reasonable basis" obligation on the part of
underwriters: "The Commission believes that the provisions in the
Rule also contribute to a municipal underwriter's ability to meet
its 'reasonable basis' obligation."" The Rule governs the dissemi-
nation of official statements prepared in conjunction with offerings
or remarketings of municipal securities involving a principal
amount of $1 million or more.85 The Rule applies to any broker-
dealer or bank that underwrites a primary .offering or participates
in certain remarketings of municipal securities."
The Rule requires that a Participating Underwriter, prior to
bidding for, purchasing, offering or selling municipal securities,
obtain and review for completeness and accuracy an official state-
ment that the issuer deems final." In the case of negotiated
transactions, the putative underwriter must send a copy of the
most recent preliminary official statement within one day to any
prospective customer who requests it.' This -obligation ceases
when the final official statement is available.89 In both negotiated
and competitively bid transactions, the underwriter must contract
with the issuer to receive, within seven business days after contract-
ing or offering to purchase the issuer's securities, enough final
official statements to meet its distribution obligations under the
Rule." The distribution obligation commences upon receipt of
the final offering statement and continues for a period of ninety
days after the end of the marketing period." This distribution
period may be reduced to twenty-five days if the offering state-
ment is made available to any person at a central information
repository.
92
For competitive transactions, the requirements of the Rule are
not nearly as clear. The requirement of the Rule that has caused
the most confusion is that prospective underwriters obtain and
review a document deemed a "near final official statement"
FIPPINGER, supra note 5, at 245-74; Fippinger & Pittman, supra note 4, at 138-56.
84 1988 Release, supra note 68, at 37,790.
85 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(a) (1993).
86 Id
87 Id. § 240.15c2-12(b)(1). A "Participating Underwriter" is a broker, dealer, or mu-
nicipal securities dealer. Id.
88 Id. § 240.15c2-12(b)(2).
89 Id.
90 Id. § 240.15c2-12(b)(3).
91 Id. § 240.15c2-12(b)(4).
92 Id.
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(NFOS)." The difficulty in interpreting this provision lies in
whether underwriters may bid on competitive offerings in which
disclosure deficiencies exist.' The SEC, in a no-action letter,"
has stated that an underwriter will satisfy its obligation under the
literal language of the Rule if it relies in good faith on the
issuer's determination that the NFOS is "final as of its date."
9
6
Therefore, an underwriter may utilize a NFOS to bid in a competi-
tive offering, despite disclosure deficiencies, provided the issuer
has deemed the NFOS final as of its date.97 To avoid antifraud
liability, however, the underwriter must obtain assurances that the
issuer will remedy these disclosure deficiencies at a later date.9
The SEC adopted very limited exemptions to the Rule, all of
which apply only to securities sold in denominations of $100,000
or greater.' One exemption is for an offering which is sold to
no more than thirty-five purchasers who meet 'certain criteria. 1' °
A second exemption is for an issue having a maximum maturity
of nine months or less.'' A third exemption covers an issue
which, at the option of the bondholder, may be tendered for
redemption at par at least as frequently as every nine months.
02
The SEC has reserved the right to adopt transactional exemptions
if it determines that such exemptions are consistent with the goal
of protecting investors.0 s
93 Id. § 240.15c2-12(b) (1); see also Fippinger & Pittman, supra note 4, at 140.
94 Fippinger & Pittman, supra note 4, at 141.
95 Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon, SEC No-Action Letter, [1990-1991
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 1 79,650, at 77,961 (Apr. 4, 1990).
96 Id. at 77,962.
97 Fippinger & Pittman, supra note 4, at 142. The release containing the Proposed
Amendments advocates amending the Rule to include an information requirement in the
definition of final official statement. 1994 Release, supra note 15, at 12,762-63. The defi-
nition of final official statement also governs the items of information to be included in
the NFOS, subject to availability considerations. Id. at 12,762. The proposed amendment
would define the final official statement to include "information concerning the terms of
a proposed issue of securities, and financial and operating information concerning the
issuer that is adequate to provide a fair presentation of the issuer's current financial
condition and results of operations and cash flows, including audited financial state-
ments." Id. at 12,763. Such information also would be required for any significant obli-
gor. Id. An obligor is viewed as 'significant' if it is the source of 20% percent or more
of the cash flow servicing the obligations of the securities. Id
98 Fippinger & Pittman, supra note 4, at 142.
99 17 C.F.R. § 15c2-12(c) (1993).
100 Id. § 240.15c2-12(c)(1).
101 Id. § 240.15c2-12(c)(2).
102 I& § 240.15c2-12(c)(3).
103 Id § 240.15c2-12(d).
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Both the Interpretation and the Rule reflect a more active
stance by the SEC towards disclosure and interpretive deficiencies
in the municipal marketplace. By adopting the Rule and inform-
ing underwriters of what standards apply under the antifraud pro-
visions of the federal securities laws, the SEC has attempted to
improve disclosure and reduce fraud without subjecting municipal
issuers to the costly and formalized registration and ongoing re-
porting requirements applicable to corporate issuers.
III. SECONDARY MARKET DISCLOSURE DEFICIENCIES
As a result of the investigations into campaign contribution
practices in the municipal market,"' attention has once again
104 For a discussion of the scandal, see Leah Nathans Spiro & Kelley Holland, The
Trouble with Munis, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 6, 1993, at 44. In late April 1993, the municipal
market was shaken with the announcement that Merrill Lynch & Co., the leading un-
derwriter of municipal bonds, had placed three of its highest ranking officials in its mu-
nicipal bond department on administiative leave because of "apparent irregularities" in a
New Jersey Turnpike Authority refunding issue. Patrick M. Fitzgibbons & Sean Monsarrat,
Investigation Into New Jersey Bond Refunding Triggers Wary Reaction in Municipal Market, BOND
BUYER, May 10, 1993, at 1. These irregularities allegedly arose from payments made to
Armacon Securities, a New Jersey-based bond dealer 50%-owned by Joseph Salema, a
former top aide to Governor Jim Florio. Vicky Stamas, MSRB's Statement May Reveal Posi-
tion on Campaign Money from Bond Firms, BOND BUYER, May 19, 1993, at 1. These pay-
ments are alleged to have been made to secure a better underwriting position for Merrill
Lynch on $2.9 billion of negotiated refundings issued by the Authority. Id. The an--
nouncement by Merrill Lynch came as a result of widespread investigations into the
refundings and Armacon's relationship with Merrill Lynch, launched by various federal
government authorities, including the SEC and the U.S. Attorney's Office. I&
Contemporaneously with the launching of the federal government investigation, the
New York City Department of Investigation launched a probe into the selection of Fleet
Securities as one of the co-managers on the city's bond underwriting syndicate. Charles
Gasparino, Holtzman Says Loan Didn't Sway Choice of TIet to Handle New York City Debt,
BOND BUYER, Apr. 26, 1993, at 1. Fleet was chosen on the recommendation of Elizabeth
Holtzman's office after her failed Senate campaign received a $450,000 loan from its affil-
iate, Fleet Bank. Id. Holtzman has since lost a primary bid for reelection to the position
of Comptroller, an event many view as being a direct result of voter dissatisfaction with
underhanded dealings by politicians with Wall Street. John H. Allan, A Wake-Up Call in
New York, BOND BUYER, Oct. 4, 1993, at 18. The New Jersey and New York investigations
prompted other states, including Massachusetts and Louisiana, to launch their own investi-
gations into questionable underwriting practices. See Spiro & Holland, supra, at 44, 50-51.
At its annual meeting held in late July 1993, the MSRB proposed a two-prong rule
designed to control political contributions made by broker-dealers to issuers. Vicky
Stamas, MSRB Says It Will Propose an Aggressive Rule to Curb Contributions Dealers Make to
Issuers, BOND BUYER, Aug. 5, 1993, at 1. Under one part of the rule, broker-dealers would
be prohibited from making direct or indirect payments that are designed to capture or
keep an issuer's bond business. Id. Under the second prong, broker-dealers would be
required to disclose for both two years before and two years after they have done busi-
ness with an issuer all political gifts made to that issuer. Id. The MSRB filed its proposed
rule, designated as MSRB Rule G-37, with the SEC on January 12, 1994, and the SEC
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become focused on the issue of inadequate secondary market
disclosure. 5 The SEC has responded by issuing the Statement
and the Proposed Amendments, discussed in Subpart B below.
A. The Ongoing Problem of Deficient Secondary Market Disclosure
In the late 1980s, the MSRB became increasingly concerned
with the lack of disclosure in the municipal marketplace.' In
released the proposal for public comment on January 14, 1994. Exchange Act Release
No. 33,482, 59 Fed. Reg. 3389 (Jan. 14, 1994).
105 Shortly after the political contributions scandal broke, see supra note 104, several
congressional investigations followed. On May 25, 1993, Rep. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., Chair-
man of the House Small Business Committee's Subcommittee on Regulation, sent a letter
to the SEC, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the MSRB indi-
cating that he may hold hearings and introduce legislation to overcome the lack of com-
petitive bidding in the municipal bond market. Vicky Stamas & Lynn Stevens Hume,
House Subcommittee Begins Investigation Into Negotiated Sale of Municipal Bnds, BOND BUYER,
June 2, 1993, at 1. On May 26, 1993, the House Energy and Commerce Committee,
chaired by Rep. John Dingell, D-Mich., announced that it was launching an investigation
of the municipal market to determine if federal regulation should be tightened and if
the Tower Amendment should be repealed. Vicky Stamas, Congressional Panel to Investigate
Municipals, Review its Regulation, BOND BUYER, May 27, 1993, at 1. The congressional
probe was announced in a letter addressed to the SEC, the NASD and the MSRB asking
the three regulatory groups to investigate the current regulation, of the market in light of
the scandals, along with concerns over the scope of voluntary secondary market disclo-
sure. Id.
On July 14, 1993, Rep. Dingell and Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass., asked the SEC to
broaden its inquiry to include bond counsel, consultants, and other experts involved in
municipal bond financings. Vicky Stamas, Dingell, Markey. Ask SEC to Expand ProbeInto
Firms' Political Donations, BOND BUYER, July 15, 1993, at 1. The House Energy and Com-
merce Committee's Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, chaired by Rep.
Markey, has since conducted hearings into the federal regulation of the municipal mar-
ket. Vicky Stamas, Markey Leaning Toward Ongoing Disclosure Bill, BOND BUYER, Oct. 8,
1993, at 1. Markey has stated that he is "very seriously" considering drafting legislation
that would require municipal bond issuers to provide ongoing disclosure. Id. To date,
Markey has not taken any further action and has indicated that he would not introduce
legislation to curb political contributions but would, for the time being, leave that issue
up to regulators and the industry to solve. Id. The House subcommittee is likely to re-
sume hearings on the municipal market this spring, but it is undetermined what the
focus of those hearings will be. Vicky Stamas, Markey Subcommittee Will Probably Return to
Municipals this Spring Aide Says, BOND BUYER, Feb. 24, 1994, at 7.
Finally, Rep. Jim Leach, R-Iowa, and Rep. Henry Gonzalez, D-Tex., introduced legis-
lation in late June that would repeal the Tower Amendment and also require underwrit-
ers, bond counsel, and broker-dealers to disclose political contributions. Vicky Stamas &
Lynn Stevens Hume, Proposal Would Repeal Tower, Seek Disclosure of Contributions, BOND
BUYER, June 22, 1993, at 1. The bill was immediately referred to committee, raising ques-
tions on Capitol Hill as to whether it would meet with much success. Id. In what is be-
ing viewed as an escalating turf battle, Rep. Dingell has gone on record as saying that
the proposed legislation is "fatally flawed" and that his panel will ignore the bill. Vicky
Stamas, Dingell Warns Bill to Repeal Tower is Tatally Flawed' BOND BUYER, Aug. 10, 1993, at
1.
105 See Exchange Act Release No. 28,197, 55 Fed. Reg. 29,436 (July 19, 1990) ("In
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1990 and 1991, the SEC approved rule changes promulgated by
the MSRB to commence the development of a central, electronic
disclosure repository."°7  MSRB Rule G-36,ls approved by the
SEC in 19 9 0°" and amended in 1991,11' mandates that under-
writers subject to the Rule send the MSRB a copy of the final
official statement prepared in conjunction with an offering within
one business day of receipt of the final offering statement from
the issuer, but no later than ten business days after the sale
date."' Underwriters of municipal securities not covered by the
Rule, such as underwriters of issues under $1 million, must send a
final official statement to the MSRB within one business day of the
closing if a final official statement was prepared in conjunction
with the offering."' Underwriters of offerings exempt from the
Rule under section 15c2-12(c) are under no obligation to file of-
fering documentation with the MSRB."' In addition, Rule G-36
requires underwriters to file certain advance refunding documents
and stickered final official statements in a manner similar to the
filing requirements for final official statements."'
The mandatory filing requirements were to be the first stage
in the MSRB's plan to establish and operate a central electronic
disclosure facility, which it refers to as the Municipal Securities
Information Library (MSIL)."5 Documents collected pursuant to
Rule G-36 would be available electronically to market participants
the course of its rulemaking activities, the Board has observed a critical need for an im-
proved flow of information about municipal securities issues into the market."). In this
release, the MSRB proposed creating a system known as the Municipal Securities Informa-
tion Library to receive and disseminate certain mandatory and voluntary disclosure. Id.;
see infra text accompanying notes 115-30.
107 Exchange Act Release No. 28,081, 55 Fed. Reg. 23,333 (June 7, 1990) (approving
MSRB Rule G-36, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 108-14); Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 29,298, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,194 (June 19, 1991) (approving the Municipal Securi-
ties Information Library, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 115-30); Exchange
Act Release No. 29,299, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,204 (June 19, 1991) (approving amendments to
Rule G-36 regarding the filing of advance refunding documents).
108 Mun. Sec. Rul. Bd. Man. (CCH) 3676, at 5415-4.
109 Exchange Act Release No. 28,081, supra note 107.
110 Exchange Act Release No. 29,299, supra note 107.
111 MSRB Rule G-36(b)(i), Mun. Sec. Rul. Bd. Man. (CCH) 1 3676, at 5415-4.
112 MSRB Rule G-36(c)(i), Mun. Sec. Rul. Bd. Man. (CCH) 3676, at 5415-4.
113 MSRB Rule G-36(c)(iii), Mun. Sec. Rul. Bd. Man. (CCH) 1 3676, at 5415-5.
114 MSRB Rule G-36(b)(ii), Mun. Sec. Rul. Bd. Man. (CCH) 3676, at 5415-4; MSRB
Rule 0-36(c)(ii), Mun. Sec. Rul. Bd. Man. (CCH) 1 3676, at 5415-5; MSRB Rule 0-36(d),
Mun. Sec. Rul. Bd. Man. (CCH) 1 3676, at 5415-5.
115 See Exchange Act Release No. 28,081, supra note 107, at 23,333-34.
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and information vendors for use in value added products such as
market analyses and document summaries.
To address the persistent problem of inadequate secondary
market disclosure, the MSRB, as a supplement to the MSIL system,
proposed a rule change in 1990 to add a facility plan to accept
and disseminate voluntarily submitted continuing disclosure infor-
mation (CDI). 17 The rule change was adopted as a result of the
MSRB's concern with information deficiencies in the secondary
market:
The Board believes that improved access to CDI is neces-
sary not only so that dealers can comply with the Board's cus-
tomer protection rules, but also to enhance the integrity and
efficiency of the market. The lack of access to CDI not only
creates problems in specific transactions, but also creates gener-
al inefficiency in the market. Market participants are aware that
their transactions may be executed based on incomplete or
erroneous information about the securities and this is necessari-
ly taken into account in pricing transactions, thus eroding the
accurate pricing of those securities and the general efficiency
of the market."1
Thus, the MSRB publicly recognizes the deleterious effects upon
the entire municipal market of .inadequate secondary market dis-
closure.
Submission to the CDI portion of the MSIL is entirely volun-
tary."' The MSRB was hopeful that creating a central repository
would enhance efforts by market participants to increase ongoing
disclosure:
[T]he Board believes that the existence of a central repository
for CDI, which provides a neutral, fair and timely dissemination
mechanism for disclosure information, would not only increase
the availability of the CDI currently produced, but also encour-
age voluntary efforts in the industry to improve the content
and timing of CDI.'I
The MSRB based its optimism, in part, on the greater responsibil-
ity which certain market participants assume in providing voluntary
116 See Exchange Act Release No. 29,298, supra note 107, at 28,195.
117 Exchange Act Release No. 28,199, 55 Fed. Reg. 29,691 (July 20, 1990); see also
FIPPINGER, supra note 5, at 316-17.
118 Exchange Act Release No. 30,556, 57 Fed. Reg. 12,534-35 (Apr. 10, 1992).
119 See id. at 12,534.
120 Id at 12,535.
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market disclosure."' For instance, in 1991 the American Bankers
Association (ABA), representing bank trustees, published its own
guidelines on trustee disclosure.'22 Those guidelines are designed
to help trustees determine the content and timing of various types
of voluntarily provided CDI' 25 The MSRB believed that the exis-
tence of a central repository would "facilitate voluntary efforts [by
issuers and trustees] to address the information problems that
continue to exist in the municipal market."
24
To date, it appears that the MSRB's optimism was unwarrant-
ed. Voluntary participation by issuers in the CDI system has been
very low." A significant reason for the lack of voluntary efforts
by issuers to provide secondary market disclosure may be the fear
of violating the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act. 26 There is
little doubt that postdistribution information voluntarily filed with
the MSIL system would be subject to the same standard of care
applicable to statements generally, if such proffered information
was "calculated to influence the investing public."2 ' Therefore,
voluntarily filed CDI subsequently found to contain inaccurate,
misleading or incorrect statements would be subject to the duty to
correct if the statements were deemed by a court to be material at
the time of discovery. 21 In the absence of further regulatory
guidance, the duty to correct may provide a significant disincentive
for volunthry disclosure, therefore making it less likely that issuers
will provide ongoing disclosure unless required." The SEC is-
sued the Statement in order to provide voluntary disclosure guid-
ance to municipal issuers' 3
121 See id at 12,538-39.
122 AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, CORPORATE TRUST COMMrITEE, PROPOSED DIS-
CLOSURE GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE TRUSTEES (1991).
123 See FIPPINGER, supra note 5, at 324-27.
124 Exchange Act Release No. 30,556, supra note 118, at 12,535.
125 See Vicky Stamas, MSRB Asked to Help Finance Secondary Market Disclosure Initiative,
BOND BUYER, Aug. 4, 1993, at 2.
126 See FIPPINGER, supra note 5, at 293-94.
127 Id. at 243.
128 J& at 293. This duty may extend to correcting or revising "a prior statement
which was accurate when made but which has become misleading due to subsequent
events." Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In addition, a
duty may exist to update a prior accurate statement in a circumstance in which that
statement "may have a forward intent and connotation upon which parties may be ex-
pected to rely." Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
129 See FIPPINGER, supra note 5, at 293. The additional duty to update forward-looking
statements may provide another significant disincentive. Id. See supra note 128.
130 See 1994 Statement, supra note 13.
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B. The Statement and the Proposed Amendments
1. The Statement
On March 9, 1994, the SEC issued the Statement to advise
issuers and underwriters of ways to minimize potential exposure to
antifraud liability through increased disclosure in both the primary
and secondary municipal securities markets."' 1 While stressing
that the Statement does not alter what constitutes an antifraud
violation, the SEC addressed several key areas for improvements in
disclosure practices."" The staff of the Divisions of Corporation
Finance and Market Regulation stated that the" Statement and the
Proposed Amendments are based upon recommendations submit-
ted in December by the Public Securities Association, the Govern-
ment Finance Officers Association, and other industry leaders.'"
The Statement focuses heavily upon primary market disclo-
sure, which surprised some market participants."s4 Recognizing
"the significant improvement in disclosure practices in recent years
as a result of voluntary initiatives,"' the Statement addresses the
following five matters for increased attention in primary offering
disclosure:
(a) disclosure of potential conflicts of interest and material
financial relationships among issuers, advisers and underwriters,
including those arising from political contributions;
(b) disclosure regarding terms and risks of securities being
offered;
(c) disclosure of the issuer's or obligor's financial condition,
results of operations, and cash flows;
(d) disclosure of the issuer's plans regarding the provision of
information to the secondary market; and
(e) timely delivery of preliminary official statements to under-
writers and potential investors."
131 See id
132 See id. at 12,750-57.
133 SEC Issues Antifraud Guidance, Rule Proposals on Muni-Bond Disclosure 26 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 351 (Mar. 11, 1994) [hereinafter SEC Issues Antifraud Guid-
ance].
134 Christopher Taylor, Executive Director of the MSRB, declared that one of the
surprises in the Statement is that it addresses obligations with respect to the primary
market. Id. at 352.
135 1994 Statement, supra note 13, at 12,748.
136 Id
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The Statement discusses each recommendation in detail and sug-
gests ways that issuers and underwriters can comply with the SEC's
suggestions.1'3
The second major focus of the Statement concerns disclosure
in the secondary market for municipal securities." The SEC
highlights its concern in this area: "While significant progress has
been made in primary market disclosure in recent years, the same
development has not taken place with respect to secondary market
disclosure."" 9 According to the SEC's staff, the purpose of the
Statement is to clarify the potential for antifraud liability of issuers
in connection with public statements and reports upon which sec-
ondary market participants may rely."4 In particular, the State-
ment identifies the following suggested mechanisms for reducing
potential liability exposure:
(a) publication of financial information, including audited
financial statements and other financial and operating informa-
tion, on at least an annual basis;
(b) timely reporting of material events reflecting upon the
creditworthiness of the issuer or the obligor and the terms of
its securities, including material defaults, draws on reserves,
adverse rating changes and receipt of an adverse tax opinion;
and
(c) submission of such information to an information reposito-
ry.
141
The Statement takes a tough stand on the issue of whether
silence can shield an issuer from potential antifraud liability:
[I]ssuers and obligors are at times advised by their professional
advisors that there is no duty under the federal securities laws
to make disclosure following the completion of the distribution.
At least some municipal issuers thus appear to believe that
silence shields them from liability from what may later be
found to be false or misleading information. As a practical
matter, however, municipal issuers do not have the option of
remaining silent. Given the wide range of information routinely
released to the public, formally and informally, by these issuers
in their day-to-day operations, the stream of information on'
which the market relies does not cease with the close of a
137 See id at 12,750-55.
138 See id at 12,755-57.
139 Id. at 12,755.
140 SEC Issues Antifraud Guidance, supra note 133, at 351.
141 1994 Statement, supra note 13, at 12,756-57.
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municipal offering. In light of the public nature of these issu-
ers and their accountability and government functions, a variety
of information about issuers of municipal securities is collected
by state and local governmental bodies', and routinely made
publicly available. Municipal officials also make frequent public
statements and issue press releases concerning the entity's fiscal
affairs
42
The Statement therefore recognizes that, given the public nature
of municipalities, complete silence is in fact impossible to main-
tain in the ordinary course of an issuer's activities.
The Statement explains that when a municipal issuer releases
public information, it may be subject to the antifraud provisions
even if the information was not intended to be the basis of invest-
ment decisions." The Statement asserts that:
The fact that [public statements] are not published for purpos-
es of informing the securities markets does not alter the man-
date that they not violate antifraud proscriptions. Those state-
ments are a principal source of significant, current, information
about the issuer of the security, and thus reasonably can be
expected to reach investors and the trading market....
The Statement thus casts a wide regulatory net over information
released to the public by municipal issuers.
The Statement addresses the risk to issuers of misleading
investors by releasing public statements which may not be intend-
ed to be the basis of investment decisions, but which nevertheless
may reasonably be expected to reach the securities markets.'45
To minimize this risk, the Statement urges that "municipal issuers
should establish practices and procedures to identify and timely
disclose, in a manner designed to inform the market, material
information reflecting on the creditworthiness of the issuer and
the obligor in terms of the security."' The Statement counsels
142 Id. at 12,755-56.
143 See id. at 12,756.
144 Id. The Statement also warns issuers that antifraud liability may attach for failure
to update forward-looking statements contained within an official statement: "To the ex-
tent that the official statement in many cases remains the principal (or perhaps even the
sole) source of information concerning an outstanding security, the potential for an obli-
gation to update is of particular importance." Id. at 12,756 n.90; see also supra note 128.
145 See 1994 Statement, supra note 13, at 12,756.
146 Id
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issuers to adopt its suggestions, as outlined above, to accomplish
this purpose.
1 47
Finally, the Statement advises underwriters of their duty to
review the issuer's disclosure documents before offering, selling, or
bidding for the issuer's securities." The Statement reiterates the
SEC's position in the Interpretation that municipal underwriters
must have a reasonable belief as to the accuracy and completeness
of the representations made in offering documentation. 149 In ad-
dition, the Statement goes further than the Interpretation in stat-
ing that a broker-dealer must have a reasonable basis for recom-
mending municipal securities in the secondary market.5 ' The
Statement also repeats Chairman Levitt's recommendation to Con-
gress to repeal the exemption from the registration provisions of
the securities laws for corporate obligations underlying certain
non-governmental conduit securities.'
2. The Proposed Amendments
With the Statement, in a separate release, the SEC issued the
Proposed Amendments. 5 2 The SEC is advancing the Proposed
Amendments to "assist brokers, dealers, apid municipal securities
dealers in satisfying their obligations under the antifraud provision
of the federal securities laws, and specifically under [1934 Act]
Section 15(c) (2) [of the 1934 Act], by conditioning the underwrit-
ing and recommendation of municipal securities on the availability
of current issuer information."' The SEC expects that the Pro-
posed Amendments will help deter fraud in both the primary and
secondary markets, and "assist investors in protecting themselves
147 See id.
148 Id at 12,757-58.
149 See id. at 12,758.
150 See id. This duty makes it incumbent upon a broker-dealer to establish a reason-
able basis by reviewing any publicly available disclosure. Id. The Statement further advises
that if a broker-dealer discovers any factors indicating that the disclosure is inaccurate or
incomplete, or which signals the need for further inquiry, he may need to obtain addi-
tional information, or seek to verify existing informatiotn. Id.
151 Id at 12,755. "Conduit bonds" are "municipal securities issued by a state or local
government for the benefit of a private corporation or other entity that is ultimately
obligated to pay such bonds ... ." I& at 12,754-55 n.77 (quoting GOVERNMENT FINANCE
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT DEBT AND FISCAL POLICIES, IMPROVE-
MENTS IN MUNICIPAL SECURITIES' MARKET DISCLOSURE (Feb. 1, 1994)).
152 1994 Release, supra note 15.
153 Ld. at 12,760.
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from misrepresentation or other fraudulent activity by brokers,
dealers, and municipal securities dealers. " 15
The heart of the Proposed Amendments is the suggestion to
add paragraph (b)(5), to the Rule.' This new paragraph would
prohibit a Participating Underwriter from "purchasing or selling
municipal securities in connection with an offering unless the
Participating Underwriter has reasonably determined that the issu-
er or its designated agent has undertaken in a written agreement
or contract for the benefit of holders of such municipal 'securities
to provide certain information to a NRMSIR." 5 This require-
ment contemplates that the issuer of municipal securities will un-
dertake to provide such information to a NRMSIR at the time of
delivery of municipal securities to a Participating Underwriter.'57
The Participating Underwriter satisfies its obligation under the
Proposed Amendments if it can conclude that the appropriate
covenants have been made by the issuer." Thereafter, the duty
will exist as an obligation that the issuer owes to its bondhold-
ers. 9 Ultimately, therefore, the Proposed Amendments would
create an ongoing disclosure requirement imposed directly upon
issuers.
The specific information to be provided is set forth in the
Proposed Amendments:
[Paragraph (b) (5) (i) (A)] would prohibit Participating Under-
writers from purchasing or selling municipal securities in con-
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id A "NRMSIR" is defined as a nationally recognized municipal securities infor-
mation repository. Id& While the term NRMSIR is currently used in paragraph (b)(4) of
the Rule, it is not defined therein. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12(b)(4) (1993). NRMSIRs were
discussed in the 1989 Release, supra note 75, where the SEC noted that in determining
whether a particular entity is a NRMSIR, it would look at, among other things, whether
the repository: (1) is national in scope; (2) maintains current, accurate information about
municipal offerings in the form of official statements; (3) has effective retrieval and dis-
semination systems; (4) places no limits on the issuers from which it will accept official
statements or related information; (5) provides access to the documents deposited with it
to anyone willing to pay the applicable fees; and (6) charges reasonable fees. Id. at
28,808 n.65. The MSRB's MSIL system, discussed in the text accompanyinig notes 115-30,
supra, is not a NRMSIR, and the MSRB has yet to seek such a status from the SEC for
the repository. See 1994 Release, supra note 15, at 12,764 n.25. The SEC is requesting'
comment on whether NRMSIR should be defined in the Rule, and what specific stan-
dards should be established for NRMSIRs. Id.
157 Id. at 12,760.
158 Id. at 12,761.
159 I&
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nection with an offering unless the Participating Underwriter
has reasonably determined that the issuer or its designated
agent has undertaken to provide to a NRMSIR, at least annual-
ly, current financial information concerning the issuer of the
municipal security and any significant obligors, including annu-
al audited financial statements and pertinent operating infor-
mation." 0
This proposed paragraph does not dictate the format of the an-
nual financial information, but rather stipulates that the issuer
provide audited financial statements which "fairly present the cur-
rent financial condition, the results of operations, and cash flows
of the municipal issuer and any significant obligor. Proposed para-
graph (b)(5) also does not dictate the content of the annual fi-
nancial information, other than the audited financial state-
ments."161 Frequent issuers may meet the standards of the Pro-
posed Amendments by including financial information in sequen-
tial offering statements. 62
Proposed paragraph (b)(5)(ii) stipulates that issuers would
also be required to
specify what accounting principles will be used in the prepara-
tion of the audited financial statements, the time within which
the annual information for each year will be available, and the
specific operating and financial information that will be provid-
ed on an annual basis, in addition to the audited financial
statements.'
This proposed paragraph does not specify the timing of the avail-
ability of annual financial information in each year, but rather re-
quires that the issuer's undertakings to provide such information
specify the annual time frame in which the information will be
provided by the issuer and any significant obligors."
In addition to annual financial information, proposed para-
graph (b) (5) (i) (B) requires Participating Underwriters to obtain
assurances that issuers provide, in a timely manner, certain materi-
al event information." If material, the Proposed Amendments
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(1) principal and interest payment delinquencies;
(2) non-payment related defaults;
(3) unscheduled draws on debt service reserves reflecting finan-
cial difficulties;
(4) unscheduled draws on credit enhancement reflecting finan-
cial difficulties;
(5) substitution of credit or liquidity providers, or their failure
to perform;
(6) adverse tax opinions or events affecting the tax-exempt
status of the security;
(7) modifications to rights of security holders;
(8) bond calls;
(9) defeasances;
(10) matters affecting collateral; and
(11) rating changes."
The Proposed Amendments release states that the issuer must "de-
termine whether information needs to be disseminated about a
listed event in any particular situation, and if so, when the infor-
mation dissemihation should occur in order to be 'timely. '""
For example, an issuer would be free to determine that a de mi-
nimis draw on a reserve fund due to a delay by an obligor in
transferring a payment, when the draw is replaced immediately, is
not a material event requiring disclosure."6  The Proposed
Amendments provide no other guidance as -to what constitutes a
material event or when dissemination of such an event must occur
to qualify as "timely."
Finally, proposed paragraph (c) would be added to the Pro-
posed Amendments, which would
prohibit any broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer from
recommending the purchase or sale of a municipal security
unless such broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer has
reviewed the information the issuer of such information has
undertaken to provide pursuant to paragraph (b)(5)."
The Proposed Amendments release emphasizes that .information
placed in a NRMSIR may not be the only source of information
which the broker-dealer must access to meet its obligations under
166 Id
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the paragraph. 7 ' A broker-dealer may "obtain information direct-
ly from the issuer, from professionals such as attorneys, accoun-
tants, or other municipal securities dealers, or from any reliable
source."' In addition, the broker-dealer may have to conduct
further investigations if it discovers any factors suggesting that the
disclosure is inaccurate or incomplete, or seek to verify existing
information.
7 2
In addition to the exemption provisions already in the
Rule,'7 the Proposed Amendments include a new exemption.
This broad provision exempts bonds of issuers who have less than
$10 million in aggregate amount of securities outstanding after an
offering, including the offered securities, and who have issued less
than $3 million in aggregate amount of municipal securities in the
forty-eight months preceding the offering.' 4 The SEC has con-
ceded that a large number of conduit issues, a major area of dis-
closure concern for Chairman Levitt, will fall within this exemp-
tion because they are "fairly small." 75
The Proposed Amendments release gives only a brief discus-
sion of the application of the Tower Amendment to the SEC's
activities. 17' The release states the SEC's belief that it is not sub-
ject to the provision of the Tower Amendment which prohibits the
MSRB from requiring issuers, either directly or indirectly, to pro-
vide to the MSRB or prospective investors any documents, includ-
ing financial statements. 77 This Note argues that such a reading




173 See supra notes 85, 99-103 and accompanying text.
174 1994 Release, supra note 15, at 12,763-64. The Proposed Amendments also contain
an exemption for municipal securities broker-dealers from the provisions of proposed
paragraph (c) for those securities which are exempt from proposed paragraph (b) (5). Id.
See supra notes 155-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of proposed paragraphs
(b)(5) and (c).
175 SEC Issues Antifraud Guidance, supra note 133, at 352. The small issuer exemption
in the Proposed Amendments is discussed further in the text accompanying notes 236-41,
infra. For a discussion of Chairman Levitt's position with regard to conduit bonds, see
supra note 151.
176 See 1994 Release, supra note 15, at 12,765.
177 See id. For a further discussion of the SEC's position with regard to the Tower
Amendment, see infra text accompanying notes 230-35.
178 See infra Part IV.B.
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IV. Do THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS VIOLATE THE SECURITIES
AcTs AMENDMENTS OF 1975?
As already explained, Congress created the MSRB in 1975 to
be the primary rulemaking authority in the municipal securities
market. 9 Subpart A will discuss the legislative history behind the
MSRB's creation, and detail the Board's powers as delegated by
the 1975 Amendments."' Subpart A will also discuss the adop-
tion of the Tower Amendment.' Subpart B will argue that the
Proposed Amendments violate Congress' intent in creating the
MSRB and adopting the Tower Amendment. That Subpart con-
cludes by advocating that any decision to regulate issuers must
come from Congress, and not the SEC. 2
A. The Creation of the MSRB and the Adoption of the Tower
Amendment
1. The MSRB
The 1975 Amendments came in response to incidences of
fraudulent trading practices brought to light by the SEC in the
early' 1970s.1' The SEC, seeking injunctions against seventy-two
municipal securities broker-dealers, found a pattern of activity
including churning of customer accounts, price markups, disregard
of suitability standards, high-pressure selling tactics and other so-
called "boiler room" conduct.' The Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs concluded that "the time has
come to revise the [1934 Act] to subject municipal securities pro-
fessionals to essentially the same regulatory scheme that applies to
other securities activities." "
The 1975 Amendments created the MSRB as a self-regulatory
organization. 6 The MSRB functions primarily to establish rules
which govern municipal securities broker-dealers.'87 The Board is
structured differently than other self-regulatory organizations, how-
179 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
180 See infra Part IVAL.
181 See infra Part WA2.
182 See infra Part W.B.
183 FIPPINGER, supra note 5, at 490.
184 Id.
185 S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1975).
186 See FIPPINGER, supra note 5, at 500; Dikeman, supra note 48, at 905.
187 See FIPPINGER, supra note 5, at 500-01.
19941
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ever, because Congress authorized it to enact rules that have the
same legal force as the rules of the SEC, provided the SEC grants
approval of such rules."' The other self-regulatory agencies, such
as the national securities exchanges, the registered clearing agen-
cies, and the National Association of Securities Dealers, were
formed voluntarily by market participants, similar to the establish-
ment of private corporations.189 These other agencies do not
have the rulemaking authority of the MSRB, nor were they formed
by an act of Congress.9 In addition, the MSRB is not a self-reg-
ulatory organization for purposes of section 19(a) of the 1934
Act,'91 does not operate as a membership organization,'92 and
has none of the trade association characteristics sometimes identi-
fied with other self-regulatory organizations.'93
Congress created the MSRB to maintain the SEC's general
authority over transactions in municipal securities, just as in other
securities.' Rules promulgated by the MSRB do not have the
force of law until granted SEC approval, 95 and section 19(c) of
the 1934 Act empowers the SEC to abrogate, add to, or delete
material from MSRB rules.'96 Section 17(a) of the 1934 Act re-
quires the MSRB to prepare such reports as the SEC determines
to be within the public interest, 197 and section 17(b) gives the
SEC the power at any time to examine the MSRB in the public
interest.9 a Pursuant to section 15B(c)(8), the SEC, with due pro-
cess safeguards, may remove from office or censure any member
or employee of the MSRB for willful violation of the 1934 Act, the
SEC's rules, or the MSRB's own rules, or for a willful abuse of
authority."o  Section 15(c)(1)20 and (2)211 of the 1934 Act
were amended to give the SEC rulemaking authority to prevent
188 Id. at 501.





194 Id. at 501.
195 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2) (1988). This provision, § 19(b) of the 1934 Act, sets forth
the parameters for SEC approval or disapproval of proposed rule changes made by self-
regulatory organizations. Id.; see also Dikeman, supra note 48, at 922-24.
196 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1988).
197 Id. § 78q(a)(1).
198 Id. § 78q(b).
199 Id. § 78o-4(c)(8).
200 Id. § 7 8o(c) (1).
201 Id. § 78o(c) (2).
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fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive devices, a power the SEC
arguably already enjoyed under section 10(b).° 2  Section
15B(b) (3) provides that nothing in section 15B shall be construed
to impair or limit the power of the SEC."3 Finally, the SEC re-
tains the power, pursuant to section 21 of the 1934 Act, to en-
force MSRB rules by injunction and administrative sanction.2 4
Despite the powers retained by the SEC and the section
15B(b)(3) reservation of powers clause, the Senate Report to the
1975 Amendments ("Senate Report") makes quite clear that Con-
gress intended the MSRB to serve as "the primary medium for
regulation of the municipal securities industry . *.". . Congress
intended to follow the lead of the corporate securities market in
extending the principal of self-regulation to the municipal securi-
ties market. 26 The Senate Report points to the* "historical rea-
sons which persuaded our predecessors to delegate government
authority to national securities exchanges and national securities
associations" and the widespread industry support for self-regula-
tion as key reasons for "the establishment of a self-regulatory struc-
ture for the municipal securities industry."
2 7
The Senate Report acknowledges that the uniqueness of the
municipal market led to, in part, the creation of the MSRB. The
Report states:
It is important that the regulation of the municipal securities
industry by the [MSRB] and the [SEC] take into account the
uniqueness of the industry and its distinctions from the corpo-
rate securities industry. Thus, rules which may be suitable and
appropriate for the former may not be so for the latter.
28
Congress recognized the unique nature of public finance when
compared with corporate finance and acknowledged the value of
having rules developed by MSRB members with expertise in the
municipal securities industry.2"
202 ld. § 78j.
203 Id. § 78o-4(b)(3).
204 Id. § 78u.
205 S. REP. No. 75, supra note 185, at 48; see also Dikeman, supra note 48, at 905.
206 See S. REP. No. 75, supra note 185, at 46.
207 Id
208 Id. at 48.
209 See id. at 47-48; see also FIPPINGER, supra note 5, at 30; Peacock, supra note 48, at
2059 ("[T]he MSRB may well be a useful fund of practical knowledge in identifying
abuses without unnecessarily regulating.").
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The congressionally mandated SEC approval process for pro-
posed MSRB rules is intended to provide "an administrative forum
for the education of SEC .Commissioners in the unique issues of
public finance, an opportunity for widescale debate of MSRB rules,
and an acceptance of those rules as part of the general system of
securities regulation."210 Such a process recognizes the weaknesses
of the SEC, with its orientation towards corporate finance, in the
complex and diverse field of public finance. SEC Chairman
Levitt has conceded the SEC's weakness in the public finance
arena by recently stating that the agency is looking to hire new
staff members with expertise in the field.2
Specifically, in section 15B(b)(2) of the 1934 Act, Congress
charged the MSRB to adopt rules to provide for: (1) standards of
training, experience, and competence, as well as such other quali-
fications as the MSRB finds necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors; (2) the prevention of
fraudulent or manipulative acts and practices; (3) the promotion
of just and equitable principles of trade; (4) the periodic examina-
tion of municipal securities broker-dealers to determine compli-
ance with the provisions of the 1934 Act, the rules and regulations
thereunder, and the rules of the MSRB; (5) the form and content
of quotations relating to municipal securities, including rules de-
signed to produce fair and informative quotations, and to prevent
fictitious or misleading quotations; and (6) the prescription of re-
cords to be made and kept by municipal securities broker-dealers
and the periods for which such records shall be preserved. 3
Given the MSRB's mandate, it is apparent that Congress ex-
pected the Board to be more active than the SEC in regulating
municipal securities. The Senate Report's discussion of the SEC's
rulemaking authority in the municipal securities markets makes
this clear: "In contrast to the expansive rulemaking functions of
the [MSRB], the SEC's direct rulemaking with respect to trans-
actions in municipal securities would be limited to the control of
fraudulent, manipulative, and deceptive acts and practices."2"4
210 FIPPINGER, supra note 5, at 31. For a discussion of the overlapping jurisdiction of
the SEC and the MSRB, see id. at 502-07.
211 See id. at 30.
212 See Vicky Stamas, Levitt on the SEC's Munis Push and the Market's 'Oriental Bazaar,'
BOND BUYER, Oct. 21, 1993, at 1.
213 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(2) (1988); FIPPINGER, supra note 5, at 502; see also Peacock,
supra note 48, at 2052.
214 S. REP. No. 75, supra note 185, at 50.
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The Report also states that the MSRB "should be furnished ample
opportunity to develop responsible rules for the industry."2"5
Congress intended to create a regulatory organization composed
of market participants that have particular expertise in the area of
public finance to promulgate rules to maintain market integrity
and prevent widespread abuses.21 6
2. The Tower Amendment
Prior to the adoption of the 1975 Amendments, issuers ex-
pressed serious concern that they remain exempt from any of the
registration and reporting requirements contained within the 1933
and .1934 Acts. 217 In crafting the 1975 Amendments, Congress
recognized those concerns and struck a balance between
intergovernmental comity and the need for greater market regula-
tion by incorporating the Tower Amendment into the
legislation.18 In section 15B(d) (1) of the 1934 Act, Congress
prohibits both the SEC and the MSRB from requiring
any issuer of municipal securities, directly or indirectly through
a purchaser or prospective purchaser of securities from the
issuer, to file with the Commission or the Board prior to the
sale of such securities by the issuer any application, report or
document in connection with, the issuance, sale or distribution
of such securities.
21 9
In section 15B(d) (2), Congress further precludes the MSRB from
requiring
any issuer of municipal securities, directly or indirectly through
a municipal securities broker or municipal securities dealer or
otherwise, to furnish to the Board or to a purchaser or pro-
spective purchaser of such securities any application, report,
document, or information with respect to such issuer[.]j 0
Interestingly, the section 15B(d)(2) preclusion does not include
the SEC. The final sentence of section 15B(d)(2) contains a reser-
215 Id. at 48.
216 See id. at 47.
217 See id. at 44.
218 15 U.S.C. § 78o.4(d) (1988); see also S. REP. No. 75, supra note 185, at 44-45;
FIPPINGER, supra note 5, at 31; Peacock, supra note 48, at 2052-53. The Tower Amend-
ment was named for the late Senator John Tower of Texas, a member of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.
219 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d)(1) (1988).
220 Id- § 78o-4(d)(2).
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vation of powers clause which states that "[n]othing in this para-
graph shall be construed to impair or limit the power of the Com-
mission under any provision of this title."22 There is nothing in
the Senate Report or the legislative history to the 1975 Amend-
ments which indicates why the SEC was not included in the sec-
tion 15B(d)(2) proscription.
The Senate Report to the 1975 Amendments clarifies
Congress' intent in adopting the Tower Amendment. The Report
states that "nothing in the legislation contemplates direct regula-
tion of issuers or the registration of their securities .... . In
its discussion of the need for the MSRB and the SEC to recognize
the uniqueness of the municipal securities industry, the Report
states that "[m]unicipal issuers generally are, and will continue to
be exempt from the registration and reporting requirements of
the [1933 and 1934 Acts]."223 In addition, the Senate Report
makes Congress' intent quite clear: The SEC's direct rulemaking
authority with respect to transactions in municipal securities is lim-
ited to the control of fraudulent, manipulative, and deceptive
practices. 4
221 Id.
222 S. REP. No. 75, supra note 185, at 44. The Senate debate on the 1975 Amend-
ments is further illustrative of Congress' intent to continue to exempt municipal issuers
from the federal securities laws:
With respect to the authority of the [MSRB], the [Tower Amendment] would
simply clarify the position the Committee articulated in its report, namely that
the bill is not intended to tamper in any way with prerogatives of State and
local governments in their sale of securities. The amendment thus states that the
[MSRB] may not impose on issuers, directly or indirectly, disclosure require-
ments. Surely there can be no argument with that result.
121 CONG. REC. 510,736 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1975) (statement of Sen. Williams). Senator
Tower reiterates this position:
Under the [Tower Amendment], the Board would not have the authority to
require State and local government units to provide information about their
operations. Much of this information will undoubtedly by made available in any
case. Furthermore, the Board can obtain such information from municipal secu-
rities brokers and dealers who already supply such information to investors. The
amendment is designed to make it clear that the bill will not be a means of
subjecting States, cities, counties, or villages to any unnecessary disclosure re-
quirements which could be promulgated by the new Board.
Id. at S10,737.
223 S. REP. No. 75, supra note 185, at 48; see also supra note 222.
224 S. REP. No. 75, supra note 185, at 50.
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B. Are the Proposed Amendments Beyond the SEC's Authority?
In light of the legislative history behind the Tower Amend-
ment,' the Proposed Amendments exceed the original congres-
sional mandate for regulating the municipal bond industry. The
Senate Report makes it clear that Congress did not contemplate
the direct or indirect regulation of municipal issuers with the
passage of the 1975 Amendments.226 Moreover, the Report states
Congress' position that the MSRB, and not the SEC, is the prima-
ry regulatory authority in the municipal bond market.' At the
very least, it is unclear whether Congress intended to exclude the
SEC from the explicit proscription it levied against the MSRB in
section 15B(b) (2). 8 Chairman Levitt frankly conceded this am-
biguity in his remark that "a complete overhaul of the existing sys-
tem . . . would be the only meaningful way to ensure comprehen-
sive disclosure both on an initial and continuing basis."'
The release containing the Proposed Amendments states the
SEC's current position with regard to the Tower Amendment. 2
The SEC believes that the section 15B(b) (2) proscription does not
prevent it from adopting rules which mandate ongoing issuer
disclosure, provided those rules are reasonably designed to prevent
225 See supra Part IVA.2.
226 See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 205-09, 214-16 and accompanying text.
228 See Vicky Stamas, SEC May Seek New Legislation Aimed at Aiding Muni Disclosure,
BOND BUYER, Sept. 3, 1993, at 1 ("Under current law, the commission can regulate the
activities of municipal securities broker-dealers. But it is not crystal clear under the so-
called Tower amendment whether the SEC has the authority to impose any rules that
have indirect impact on the activities of issuers.").
229 SEC to Seek Improved Disclosure In Muni-Bond Market, Levitt Tells Pane 25 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1234 (Sept. 17, 1993). Chairman Levitt made this statement
on Sept. 9, 1993 in testimony before the House Energy and Commerce Committee's Sub-
committee on Telecommunications and Finance. Id. Chairman Levitt further told the
Subcommittee that the power to repeal the Tower Amendment, as well as to require full
disclosure in the municipal bond market, is "there to be used if necessary." Id. For a
discussion of the congressional investigations into the municipal market, see supra note
105. SEC Commissioner Richard Roberts, who along with Chairman Levitt has taken a
very active stance with regard to the political contribution scandal and disclosure issues,
has reiterated the Chairman's position that "legislation giving the SEC clear authority to
require issuers to provide secondary market disclosure is the only meaningful way to
ensure comprehensive disclosure in the municipal market." Vicky Stamas, SEC's Roberts Say
He's Out of Patience, Regulators Must Act on Muni Disclosur BOND BUYER, Sept. 16, 1993, at
1.
230 See 1994 Release, supra note 15, at. 12,765.
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fraud."' In discussing the last sentence of section 15B(d) (2), the
release states that "while prohibiting the Commission from requir-
ing municipal issuers to file reports or documents prior to issuing
securities in Section 15B(d) (1), Congress expanded the
Commission's authority to adopt rules reasonably designed to




This expansive reading of section 15B(d) (2) finds no support
in the Senate Report. Indeed, it is clear that Congress intended to
limit the SEC's antifraud powers in the municipal market to those
powers which it already had, while giving the MSRB expansive
rulemaking authority.233 It is quite possible that Congress elected
not to include the SEC in the section 15B(d) (2) proscription
because it intended the MSRB to be the primary rulemaking au-
thority in the municipal market and did not envision the SEC
playing a significant primary role in the regulation of the mar-
ket." The Senate Banking Committee therefore might not have
foreseen the need to include a specific proscription of the SEC's
already limited powers in regulating the municipal market. More-
over, it is difficult to conceive why Congress would have pro-
scribed the MSRB from requiring issuers to provide ongoing
disclosure if the SEC could accomplish the same result by promul-
gating mandates such as those in the Proposed Amendments. Such
a result contradicts the congressional intent of the Tower Amend-
ment in exempting issuers from the ongoing disclosure require-
ments of the 1934 Act.
235
The Proposed Amendments are also flawed in exempting a
large number of small issuersY.2 6 As such, the Proposed Amend-
ments may not significantly deter fraud and market manipulation,
as the SEC asserts.237 Municipal market participants agree that
the largest problem they face with regard to obtaining disclosure
is with small, infrequent issuers. 38 Larger issuers are typically not
as problematic, due to their size, market sophistication, and the
231 See id.
232 Id.
233 See S. REP. No. 75, supra note 185, at 50; see also supra notes 214, 224 and ac-
companying text.
234 See supra notes 205-09, 214-16 and accompanying text.
235 See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
236 See 1994 Release, supra note 15, at 12,763-64; see also supra notes 173-75 and ac-
companying text.
237 See 1994 Release, supra note 15, at 12,759-60.
238 Telephone Interview with Matthew J. Swafford, Associate, Municipal Securities
Group, PaineWebber Incorporated (Apr. 7, 1994).
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frequency with which they provide the market with updated finan-
cial statements in official statements prepared in conjunction with
each new offering. 9 Municipal securities broker-dealers recog-
nize that smaller issues in the secondary market which are infre-
quently put out for bid are the most difficult for which to form a
reliable bid, and are therefore more subject to fraud and pricing
inaccuracies.'4 It remains uncertain, then, whether the Proposed
Amendments will deter as much fraud and market manipulation as
the SEC contemplates.24'
In addition to the factors above, it is debatable whether, in
light of the Statement, the Proposed Amendments are even nec-
essary. The Statement casts as wide a net as possible over much of
the public information which a municipal authority issues, sub-
jecting such information to the antifraud provisions generally.
2 42
The Statement unambiguously suggests that issuers disclose finan-
cial information on at least an annual basis and report material
events in a timely manner in order to reduce their potential liabil-
ity.243 Is it unclear how issuers will react to the threat of in-
creased antifraud liability contained within the Statement. Issuers
will likely attempt to avoid such liability by following the SEC's
suggestions in the Statement, thus rendering the Proposed Amend-
ments unnecessary.
Finally, the Proposed Amendments would effectively create a
new layer of market regulation in the absence of a clear congres-
sional mandate. Moreover, it is now clear that the SEC has be-
come the primary rulemaking authority in the municipal market.
This result was not the intent of Congress in creating the MSRB
in 1975.2 If the MSRB has become ineffective or unable to pro-
mulgate rules which govern the municipal market, Congress, and
not the SEC, should draw this conclusion and address the prob-
lem.245 Given that Congress explicitly intended that municipal
239 Id.
240 Id
241 See 1994 Release, supra note 15, at 12,759-60. As previously noted, the SEC has
conceded that a large number of conduit issues will fall within the exemption. See supra
text accompanying note 175.
242 See 1994 Statement, supra note 13, at 12,755-56; see also supra notes 142-47 and ac-
companying text.
243 1994 Statement,-supra note 13, at 12,756-57.
244 See supra notes 205-09, 214-16 and accompanying text.
245 This Note expresses no opinion as to the effectiveness of the MSRB in fulfilling
its congressional mandate. The author recognizes, however, that there exists significant
reasons why municipal market participants might prefer to be governed by an organiza-
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issuers would continue to be exempt from the registration and
reporting requirements of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, it should be
left to Congress to determine that the time has come to alter the
current regulatory environment to include municipal issuers.
V. . CONCLUSION
This Note has examined the federal regulation of municipal
securities in light of current regulatory activities. Historically, feder-
al involvement in the municipal market has been minimal, due to
the relative safety of municipal securities. In response to market
scandals, Congress passed the 1975 Amendments to the 1934 Act
to restore municipal market integrity and deter fraud. The 1975
Amendments created the MSRB as a self-regulatory organization to
accomplish this purpose. The MSRB was established to promulgate
rules governing municipal securities broker-dealers. Congress in-
tended the MSRB to function as the primary regulatory authority
in the municipal market.
Despite this broad mandate, Congress carefully drafted the
1975 Amendments to not extend the MSRB's jurisdiction to the
regulation of municipal issuers. Congress' intent in adopting the
Tower Amendment was to continue to exempt municipal issuers
from the registration and ongoing disclosure requirements appli-
cable to corporate issuers.
In the late 1980s, the SEC assumed a more aggressive stance
with regard to municipal market regulation. In publishing the In-
terpretation and promulgating the Rule, the SEC has attempted to
improve market disclosure practices without regulating the activi-
ties of issuers. By releasing the Statement, the SEC has taken the
further step of advising issuers of ways to minimize their potential
antifraud liability through voluntary disclosure.
The Proposed Amendments represent an attempt by the SEC
to directly regulate the activities of municipal issuers. The Senate
Report to the 1975 Amendments makes clear that Congress did
not contemplate granting regulatory authority for the direct or
indirect regulation of issuers. Furthermore, the SEC has now as-
sumed the role of the primary rulemaking authority in the munici-
pal market, a result not intended by Congress in creating the
MSRB. Congress, not the SEC, should decide whether the time
has come to dramatically alter the regulatory landscape which
ion composed of market participants with special expertise in public finance.
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governs municipal securities. Therefore, the SEC should withdraw
the Proposed Amendments and pursue a legislative solution.
Mark Edward Laughman

